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Human beings routinely help strangers at costs to themselves. Sometimes the help offered is generous—offering more than
the other expects. The proximate mechanisms supporting generosity are not well-understood, but several lines of research
suggest a role for empathy. In this study, participants were infused with 40 IU oxytocin (OT) or placebo and engaged in
a blinded, one-shot decision on how to split a sum of money with a stranger that could be rejected. Those on OT were 80%
more generous than those given a placebo. OT had no effect on a unilateral monetary transfer task dissociating generosity
from altruism. OT and altruism together predicted almost half the interpersonal variation in generosity. Notably, OT had
twofold larger impact on generosity compared to altruism. This indicates that generosity is associated with both altruism as
well as an emotional identification with another person.
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INTRODUCTION
Human beings show considerable generosity toward strangers. In
2005, over $260 billion was given to U.S. charities, with $199
billion (77%) of this given by individuals [1]. The absolute amount
of charitable giving is not only high, but the proportion of income
donated has grown. In 1954, the average individual in the U.S.
gave 1.9% of after-tax income to charity ($222), while in 2005
giving averaged 2.2% of after-tax income ($656, inflation adjusted)
[1]. In 2005, approximately one-third of this giving was directed to
religious organizations, followed by 19% to health and human
services, and 15% to education. People give of their time as well as
money. In 2005, over 65 million Americans volunteered to help
charities [1]. Ninety-six percent of volunteers said that one of their
motivations was ‘‘feeling compassion toward other people’’ [2,
p 7]. In the midst of all this giving, the physiologic mechanisms
that support altruism and generosity are little understood.
Several evolutionary mechanisms have been proposed to
explain altruistic giving. These include kin selection, direct and
indirect reciprocity, group or multi-level selection, and strong
reciprocity. Kin selection [3–4] does not explain all altruistic
giving because a proportion of giving is to nonrelatives. A recent
study found that an average of 1.3% of household income was
given to nonrelatives (roughly the same amount given to religious
organizations), and an average of 20.3 person-days was spent
helping nonrelatives during a year [5]. Reciprocal altruism is
giving with an expectation of equal or larger future return from the
same person. Yet much charitable giving and direct helping of
others does not appear to provide direct reciprocation, for
example, volunteering or donating blood [2]. Indirect reciprocity
is giving to one person in the expectation of return from another
[6–8]. This relies on reputation and does not explain anonymous
giving [9] that is the focus of this paper. Group selection can
support altruistic giving to nonkin as an evolutionarily stable
strategy if individuals can be excluded from the group [10–12].
Exclusion is difficult when giving to large organizations like the
Red Cross, even though much giving is in-group directed [2].
Another multi-level selection theory, strong reciprocity, was
recently proposed to explain altruistic acts [13–14]. Strong
reciprocity, defined as altruistically rewarding cooperators and
punishing defectors, does not explain generosity when resources
are scarce. Indeed, none of these evolutionary models explicitly
predicts generosity in anonymous one-shot interactions.
In this paper we investigate a mechanism that may produce
generosity while dissociating generosity from altruism. Altruism is
defined as helping another at a cost to oneself [Sober, p 17, 15].
Generosity is defined as ‘‘liberality in giving’’ [16] or offering more
to another than he or she expects or needs. Generosity is therefore
a subset of altruism. For example, one may give a homeless person
25 cents (altruism) or ten dollars (altruism and generosity).
The role of empathy in prompting altruistic acts has been
proposed by behavioral scientists [17–23], though the roots of
this idea come from Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)[24], David
Hume (1711-1776) [25], and Adam Smith (1723-1790) [26].
Neuroimaging experiments in humans measuring empathic
responses have revealed activity in a network of brain regions,
including areas that process emotional and social information,
premotor regions, as well as pain pathways. Nonhuman primates
have also been shown to exhibit empathy [27], indicating that
human empathy has evolutionary roots. Studies measuring human
brain activity during charitable giving have shown that giving
appears to activate reward regions of the brain, as well as areas
associated with emotions and social behaviors [28–30]. Coincident
brain regions associated with empathy and charitable giving are
primarily found in subcoritical areas that process emotional
stimuli.
We investigated the role of empathy in producing generosity by
manipulating a physiologic mechanism hypothesized to instantiate
empathy, the neuromodulator oxytocin (OT). A substantial animal
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offspring, and in monogamous mammals, cohabiting sexual
partners and same-sex conspecifics [31–33]. Recent human studies
have shown that OT facilitates a temporary attachment between
strangers, increasing trust and reciprocity [34–38]. In the present
paper, we test whether OT is a proximate mechanism prompting
generosity between anonymous human strangers. Two tasks were
used to dissociate the physiologic role of empathy in producing
generosity and altruism using monetary transfers. Monetary
transfers were used to obtain objective and active measures of
generosity and altruism.
A simple mathematical model will clarify our experimental
approach (related models have been proposed [39–42], and
others). Consider a dyadic interaction between two individuals, i
and j. Let bi be the benefit that i receives, and bj the benefit to j.
Individuals obtain utility from receiving their own benefit, and
possibly from the other person receiving a benefit. We include
a parameter aM[0,1] that captures the empathy one has for the
other person. We use the term empathy in its standard meaning of
‘‘an identification with and understanding of another’s situation or
feelings’’ [43]. We expect a to be higher when one is induced to
explicitly consider one’s dyadic partner’s feelings regarding the
benefits being offered. This has been called ‘‘perspective taking’’
by social psychologists [44].
For simplicity, let utility be given by a standard form b
b, where
bM(0,1). Let total benefits be limited, bi+bj=M,‘. If person i is
asked to split the M benefits between him/herself and person j,
then i faces the following utility maximization problem,
Maxbi bj b
b
i zab
b
j
s:t: bizbj~M
bj§0:
When a=0, individual i is completely selfish, when a=1 s/he is
egalitarian. It is straightforward to show that i’s choice of the
benefit offered to j increases when a is higher.
Our experimental strategy was to induce participants to
consider another’s reaction to a split of benefits by giving j
a chance to punish i for a stingy offer. In a separate task, i was
prompted to make a unilateral monetary transfer to j absent
punishment. Because a unilateral transfer does not require
considering another’s perspective, we expected this task to produce
a lower a and an associated smaller monetary transfer. In order to
demonstrate the causal effect of OT on generosity, we infused one-
half of the participants with OT intranasally while the other half
received the same amount of normal saline.
Two decision tasks from experimental economics, the ultima-
tum game (UG) and the dictator game (DG) were used. In both
tasks, participants in randomly-formed dyads were assigned the
role of decision-maker 1 (DM1), or decision-maker 2 (DM2). In
the UG, DM1 was endowed with $10 and was asked to offer a split
of this money to DM2. DM2 has no endowment. If DM2 accepted
the split, the money was paid. But, if DM2 rejected the split, both
DMs earned nothing. Participants were asked to make decisions as
both DM1 and DM2, with subsequent random assignment of
roles. As DM2s, they were asked to state the minimum amount
they would accept from a DM1. The rejection threshold was not
reported to the other DMs. By asking subjects for the minimum
acceptable offer, the UG task was designed to have participants
consider how the DM2 in the dyad would react to an offer
(perspective taking). A rejection of DM1’s offer in the UG allowed
DM2 to punish DM1 for stingy offers, but at a cost.
We define a generous transfer in the UG as a DM1 offer that
exceeds the average minimum acceptable offer. That is, generous
offers are those which are greater than are expected for
acceptance.
The DG is similar to the UG in that DM1 has a $10
endowment and DM2 has nothing. The difference in the DG is
that DM2 has no choice—he or she must accept whatever DM1
offers. As a result, the DG does not compel DM1 to consider how
DM2 will feel about the split of benefits (reduced perspective
taking). The consensus view in experimental economics is that the
transfer in the DG is a measure of altruism [39,45]. The inclusion
of both the UG and DG allows us to dissociate generosity from
altruism within subjects.
In both the UG and DG, subjects whose identities were masked
to each other and the experimenters, were randomly assigned to
dyads without pre- or post-decision communication. All partici-
pants received the same instructions, and there was no deception.
Participants were infused with 40 IU oxytocin (OT) or placebo
(normal saline) intranasally (see Materials and Methods). The
infusion was double-blind. Participants were privately paid their
earnings in cash at the conclusion of the experiment. Our
approach followed a related study using OT to examine
interpersonal trust by means of monetary transfers [37].
RESULTS
The mean DM1 offer in the UG was 21% larger in the OT group
than in the placebo group (OT mean $4.86 (SD $1.06); placebo
mean $4.03 (SD $1.29); two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test
p=0.005; N=68). Only two subjects (both in the placebo group)
offered the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of $1 in the UG.
The DM2 minimum acceptable offer was unaffected by OT (OT
mean: $3.03 (SD $1.69); placebo mean: $2.91 (SD $1.74); two-
tailed Mann-Whitney, p=0.78). Aggregating the OT and placebo
treatments, the average minimum acceptable offer was $2.97.
Using the average minimum acceptable offer, we found that
generosity was 80% higher in OT group than in the placebo group
(OT mean: $1.89 (SD $1.06); placebo mean: $1.06 (SD $1.29);
two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test p=0.005; see Fig. 1).
Having a minimum acceptable threshold in the UG means that
some offers are rejected. It is possible that subjects on OT were
better able to forecast the rejection threshold and thus earned as
much or more money than placebo participants, rendering
generosity costless. The likelihood of an offer being rejected is
nearly identical for both groups (OT percent rejected: 14.3%;
placebo percent rejected: 14.7%). The average money earned by
the DM1s in the OT group was 5.2% lower than DM1s in the
placebo group (OT mean: $4.91 (SD $1.27); placebo mean: $5.18
(SD $1.91); one-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test p=0.03), showing
that generosity in the UG comes with a cost.
The theory presented above predicts that giving to others will be
reduced when another’s reactions are not explicitly considered. A
transfer in the DG provides a measurement of altruism absent
taking another’s perspective. We found that OT did not impact
DM1 transfers in the DG (OT mean: $3.77 (SD $2.21); placebo
mean: $3.58 (SD $2.15); two-tailed Mann-Whitney test p=0.51).
As predicted, transfers in the DG were less than in the UG. This
held even when comparing the DG transfer to UG transfer in
participants who were given the placebo (two-tailed Mann-
Whitney test p=0.04, N=34).
We also examined whether the effect of OT on generosity in the
UG continued to hold after accounting for a participant’s altruism
in the DG. A least squares regression of generosity in the UG,
controlling for the amount of altruism participants revealed in the
dictator game, and a binary OT indicator showed that OT
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0.648, two-tailed t-test p=.014; DG coeff.=.376, two-tailed t-test
p=.0001; N=68, R
2=.43).
DISCUSSION
We have shown that OT raised generosity in the UG by 80% over
placebo, and that generous participants left the experiment with
less money. The increased generosity was not due to greater
altruism because OT did not affect transfers in the DG, and the
impact of OT on generosity remains significant even when
altruism in the DG was taken into account. This finding is
consistent with a recent fMRI study of charitable giving that found
evidence for both altruism and ‘‘warm glow’’ motivations for
charity [30]. In the present study, OT and altruism together
predicted almost half the interpersonal variation in generosity.
Notably, our analysis showed that OT has approximately twice the
effect on generosity as altruism.
The difference in the decision process between the UG and the
DG, shown in the mathematical model above, suggests a reason
for these findings. DM1’s decision in the UG required a forecast of
how the DM2 would react to a proposal because of the threat of
punishment. Recent research has shown that stingy offers in the
UG provoke negative emotions in DM2s [46], and activate
a region of the brain associated with visceral disgust [47]. Our
experimental design increased OT in one-half of the participants
with the expectation that DM1s would have a more acute
understanding of how DM2s would react to an offer in the UG.
Because OT receptors in the human brain are preferentially
located in areas associated with emotions and social behaviors
(especially the amygdala, hypothalamus, and anterior cingulate
[48–49]), this suggests a role for emotions in supporting generosity.
Emotional engagement is less important in the DG as one simply
decides how much one would like to give up.
Because OT facilitates positive social behaviors in a variety of
mammal species [31], the impact on generosity found in humans is
not unexpected. But we were surprised by the 80% increase in
generosity OT induced in a setting that precluded face-to-face
interactions. For comparison, a related study of interpersonal trust
showed only a 17% increase in DM1 monetary transfers to
a stranger in the ‘‘trust game’’ for those given 24 IU intranasal OT
compared to those given a placebo [37]. OT appeared to have
selectively affected the understanding of how another would
experience a negative emotion, and seemed to have motivated
a desire to reduce DM2s’ experienced negativity. This could be
called empathy.
Based on a large number of experimental studies, Batson has
proposed the empathy-altruism hypothesis in which feeling
empathy for another provokes a desire to help him or her [20].
The findings here support and extend this proposal into what
might be called the empathy-generosity hypothesis. When induced
to take another’s perspective in the UG, due to the risk of
punishment, transfers are higher than in the DG. We showed that
empathy is a likely causal factor because OT infusion produced an
increase in generosity.
There are several possible reasons besides empathy that offers in
the UG were more generous by those given OT, though these
appear unlikely. First, previous studies have shown that those on
OT are not cognitively impaired [37,50]. Indeed, if this were the
case, one would expect that the offers in the DG and the
punishment threshold in the UG would vary between those on OT
and placebo. Second, OT could have increased risk aversion; that
is, DM1s on OT may have made larger UG offers to avoid the
chance they would be rejected. The lack of a difference in the
Figure 1. Oxytocin and generosity. Mean DM1 generosity (DM1 UG offer minus average minimum acceptable offer) for those receiving OT or
placebo. Generosity is 80% larger in the OT group (p=0.005, N=68). The increased generosity is not due to altruism as OT infusion in a task designed
to isolated altruism showed no impact relative to placebo (p=0.51, N=68).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001128.g001
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this is implausible. Further, a control task involving financial risk-
taking in a related experiment showed that risk aversion was
unaffected by OT [37]. Lastly, our results are unlikely to be due to
the small stakes involved. Increasing the stakes in the UG does not
have a substantive effect on DM1 offers or DM2 punishment
thresholds [51].
Generosity may be part of the human repertoire to sustain
cooperative relationships [19]. Several neural mechanisms likely
support generosity. OT can induce dopamine release in
ventromedial regions associated with reward [52] reinforcing
generosity. A recent fMRI study of donations to charities [28],
showed increased activation in the subgenual region of the
cingulate cortex (Brodmann area 25) when making a charitable
donation compared to receiving a monetary reward. The
subgenualis is dense in OT receptors and modulates striatal
dopamine release [53–54]. OT also down-regulates amygdala
activity in humans [55], potentially reducing anxiety associated
with relinquishing resources. OT has also been shown to increase
the ability to intuit people’s intentions from facial expressions [56].
Although choices in the present experiment were made by
computer, OT might enhance the recognition of autonomic
emotional displays associated with generosity during face-to-face
interactions. We did not find evidence that those given OT were
more emotionally labile (using the Affective Intensity Measure
[57], p=.74) nor had greater attachment anxiety or avoidance of
others via the Experiences in Close Relationships-Revised
questionnaire [58], (p=.81, p=.75, respectively).
Although we artificially raised OT levels in this study to
establish a causal mechanism producing generosity, OT can be
enhanced nonpharmacologically in a variety of ways, including
touching, safe environments, and receiving a signal of trust from
another person [31,34]. By increasing OT the ability to empathize
with others, and the motivation to be generous with them, are
enhanced. Indeed, mice that lack OT receptors suffer from social
amnesia [59]. This suggests that a variety of factors we encounter
in our daily lives may motivate us to be generous—even with
strangers.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
This experiment was approved by the Institutional Review Boards
of UCLA and Claremont Graduate University. All participants
gave written informed consent prior to inclusion. There was no
deception in any part of this experiment, and we maintained
a double-blind design. A total of 68 males participated in the
experiment with 34 of them receiving OT and 34 receiving
placebo. The mean age was 21.8 (SD 3.8). We recruited only male
subjects because of the possibility of an unintended miscarriage in
females as well as the varying effects of OT over the menstrual
cycle. All subjects were given a screening by a licensed medical
doctor (S.A.) for possible contraindications for OT. No adverse
events occurred. Exclusion criteria included significant medical or
psychiatric illness, medications that interact with OT, and drug or
alcohol abuse.
Participants were infused by nasal inhaler with either 40 IU of
OT or normal saline of the same amount. Following published
pharmacokinetics [60], the OT was allowed to load for 60 minutes
prior to the UG and DG choices. After substance administration,
participants completed questionnaires by computer to measure
demographic, social, and psychological traits. There were no
significant differences between the OT and placebo groups in the
questionnaire responses.
After the waiting period, participants read self-paced instruc-
tions while they sat in partitioned computer stations. The
instructions emphasized that the games were one-shot. After the
instructions, participants were prompted verbally to ask questions
prior to commencement of the games. Choices in the UG and DG
were made by computer. Participants were randomly assigned to
dyads by proprietary software. All participants were asked to make
choices as DM1 and DM2 in the UG, and as DM1 in the DG.
Payoffs were determined by randomly assigning participants to be
either DM1 or DM2 in the UG, and as DM1s in the DG. After the
experiment, participants were paid their earnings in private by
a lab administrator.
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